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 A capabilities-based perspective on target selection 
ABSTRACT 
 We develop a capabilities-based theory of acquirer target selection, arguing that 
acquirers will pursue both low capability targets in existing contexts to deploy existing 
capabilities, and high capability targets in new contexts to acquire new capabilities. These 
arguments are formalized in an analytical model that jointly considers the benefits and costs 
of acquisition as a function of target capability level and context. The predictions from this 
model are tested in the Chinese Brewing industry (1998-2007), with results showing that 
acquirers strongly prefer inferior targets in existing geographic markets, but are relatively 
more likely to choose superior targets in new markets, especially if they have strong 
acquisition capabilities. Our study provides insight into the factors driving target selection, 
and contributes to a capabilities-based understanding of acquisitions.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The study of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is a topic of central interest to the corporate 
strategy literature. While early work on acquisitions focused on their role in enhancing scale 
economies (Singh and Montgomery, 1987), and increasing market power (Chatterjee, 1986; 
Kim and Singal, 1993), a growing body of strategy literature has emphasized a capabilities-
based perspective on acquisitions, viewing acquisitions as a means for firms to access and 
deploy capabilities and resources1, especially those whose services cannot be directly 
transacted through the factor market, and that therefore require the firm to take ownership 
of the asset in order to make use of it (Capron, Dussuage and Mitchell, 1998; Villalonga and 
McGahan, 2005; Capron and Mitchell, 2009). More specifically, the recent literature suggests 
two distinct sources of value from acquisitions: on the one hand, acquisitions may be a 
1 We distinguish conceptually between resources, which are defined as stocks of available factors, and 
capabilities, which are the firm’s capacity to deploy these resources (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Capron and 
Mitchell, 2009). Our focus in this study is on acquisitions as a means of deploying or acquiring capabilities, 
though to the extent that this will often require the deployment or acquisition of the associated resources 
(Karim and Mitchell, 2000; Capron and Mitchell, 2009) we also build on prior work that has examined the 
acquisition and deployment of resources through acquisition.  
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means for firms to deploy their existing resources and capabilities (Capron et al, 1998; 
Capron, 1999; Kaul, 2012) creating value by improving the performance of the acquired firm 
(Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002; Berchicci, Dowell and King, 2012). On the other hand, 
acquisitions may be a means for firms to acquire new resources and capabilities (Karim and 
Mitchell, 2000; Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Graebner, 2004; Puranam, 
Singh and Chaudhuri, 2009), allowing them to bridge capability gaps (Capron and Mitchell, 
2009) and enter new markets (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Lee and Lieberman, 2010).  
The implications of these different sources of acquisition value on the acquirer’s 
choice of target remain to be fully explored, however. Prior research has emphasized the 
importance of strategic fit between acquirer and target, arguing and showing that acquisition 
value comes from combining resources and capabilities that are distinct but related, and 
therefore complementary (Shelton, 1988; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Kim and 
Finkelstein, 2009; Makri, Hitt and Lane, 2010). In contrast, studies examining acquirer target 
selection have generally found a preference for similar or less distant targets (Baum, Li and 
Usher, 2000; Schildt and Laamanen, 2006; Berchicci et al., 2012; Chakrabarti and Mitchell, 
2013). The question of what acquirers look for when assessing targets thus remains open.  
In this paper we study the antecedents of acquirer target selection from a 
capabilities-based perspective. We contend that when assessing target fit we need to 
distinguish between the level of target capabilities, and their context (Capron and Mitchell, 
2009), while considering both these dimensions simultaneously. Drawing on this distinction, 
we argue that acquirers seeking to create value by deploying their existing capabilities will 
prefer targets with weak capabilities in existing contexts, while those seeking to benefit from 
the acquisition of new capabilities will prefer targets with strong capabilities in new (though 
related) contexts. Between the two, we expect capability deployment to be more strongly 
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preferred than capability acquisition because of the higher costs of acquisitions in new 
contexts, so that the firm’s overall preference will be for targets in existing contexts and with 
weak capabilities, with the preference for weak targets being stronger in existing contexts 
than in new contexts. Moreover, we expect that firms with weak acquisition capabilities will 
limit themselves to acquiring inferior targets in existing markets, and only those with strong 
acquisition capabilities will pursue targets with superior capabilities and in new markets.  
We formalize these arguments using a simple analytical model that allows us to 
consider the various benefits and costs associated with an acquisition as a function of the 
level and context of target capability in an integrated, coherent, and rigorous way. The model 
is used to develop a set of testable hypotheses regarding target choice for one specific type 
of capability in one specific type of context—the choice of targets with high or low 
manufacturing productivity in existing or new geographic markets. These hypotheses are 
then tested by examining horizontal acquisitions in the Chinese brewing industry from 1998 
to 2007. Using detailed productivity data for the entire population of firms in this industry, 
we show that acquirers generally prefer targets with low levels of productivity in their 
existing market, consistent with our arguments for capability deployment. When acquirers do 
buy targets in new markets, however, they are relatively more willing to pursue superior 
targets, in line with capability acquisition. These preferences are moderated by the 
acquisition capabilities of the acquirer, with weak acquisition capability firms limiting 
themselves to inferior targets in existing markets, while geographically diversified or more 
experienced acquirers pursue a wider range of targets. 
Our study thus contributes to a capabilities-based understanding of acquisitions, 
highlighting the theoretical distinction between capability deploying and capability acquiring 
benefits, and mapping these two distinct sources of value to the different types of targets 
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associated with them. In doing so, it not only extends our understanding of what constitutes 
strategic fit, it also addresses a long-standing debate about the benefits of similarity vs. 
difference in acquisition (Harrison et al., 1991; Kim and Finkelstein, 2009) by adopting a 
multi-dimensional perspective (Tanriverdi and Venkatraman, 2005). In addition, our study 
provides a substantially richer understanding of the antecedents of acquirer target choice, a 
topic that remains relatively unexplored (Schildt and Laamanen, 2006; Chakrabarti and 
Mitchell, 2013). We provide both a more rigorous formal account of this key decision, and a 
strong empirical test using detailed panel data on the entire population of potential targets.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Capability level, capability context, and types of strategic fit 
As mentioned above, a substantial body of prior work has compared the resources and 
capabilities of acquirers and targets in trying to explain either target selection or acquisition 
performance, with some studies arguing for the need for complementarity between acquirer 
and target (Shelton, 1988; Krishnan, Miller and Judge, 1997; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; 
King, Slotegraaf and Kesner, 2008; Kim and Finkelstein, 2009; Makri et al., 2010), while 
others highlight the importance of similarity (Datta, 1991; Ramaswamy 1997) and proximity 
(Baum et al., 2000; Schildt and Laamanen, 2006; Chakrabarti and Mitchell, 2013). One way 
to disentangle these seemingly contradictory arguments is to recognize that the capabilities 
of the target may be assessed along multiple dimensions. Specifically, a given functional 
capability of the target, compared with the same type of capability of the acquirer, could be 
high or low in terms of level, and similar or different in terms of context (Capron and 
Mitchell, 2009), where context could mean either product market, geographic market, or 
technology field.  The level of the target’s capability captures how much stronger or weaker 
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it is compared to the acquirer, while differences in capability context determine how relevant 
the capabilities of one firm are to the other (Lee, 2008; Capron and Mitchell, 2009). The two 
dimensions are independent of each other, moreover, so that a target could have strong or 
weak capabilities in the same or different context as the acquirer. In order to fully 
understand strategic fit, then, we need to adopt a multi-dimensional perspective (Tanriverdi 
and Venkatraman, 2005; Zaheer, Castaner and Souder, 2013), and consider both the level 
and context of a target’s capabilities simultaneously.   
In order to apply such a multi-dimensional perspective to the acquirer’s choice of 
target, we consider the sources of value creation and capture from an acquisition. Prior 
literature suggests two potential sources of acquisition value from a capabilities-based 
perspective2. On the one hand, acquirers can realize value by deploying their existing 
capabilities in order to improve target performance (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002; 
Berchicci et al., 2012). On the other hand, acquirers can benefit by acquiring new capabilities 
from the target (Capron et al., 1998; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Graebner, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf 
and Robinson, 2008; Kim and Finkelstein, 2009), combining these with their existing 
capabilities in order to plug capability gaps (Capron and Mitchell, 2009) and to deepen or 
extend their existing capabilities (Karim and Mitchell, 2000) 3.  
First, consider capability deployment. Since the value from capability deployment 
comes from raising the target’s capability level, an acquirer would prefer a target with weak 
capabilities, since the weaker a target’s capabilities, the greater the potential for 
2 Prior literature also suggests several sources of acquisition value such as market power (Chatterjee, 1986; Kim 
and Singal, 1993) and economies of scale (Singh and Montgomery, 1987) that are unrelated to capabilities. We 
limit ourselves to capabilities-based arguments in this study.  
3 Conceptually, a third source of capabilities-based value from acquisitions could result from the 
complementarity between different types of functional capabilities; for instance, by combining the marketing 
capabilities of the acquirer with the technological capabilities of the target. While we do not deny the potential 
for such complementarities, our focus in this paper is limited to developing theory about differences in the 
level and context between capabilities of the same (functional) type.  
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improvement4. Acquirers seeking to deploy their existing capabilities will also prefer targets 
operating in the same or similar contexts. Deploying acquirer’s capabilities to the target will 
only be valuable if the two capabilities operate in identical or overlapping contexts, since 
only in such a case will the acquirer’s capabilities be relevant to the target (Kim and Miner, 
2007; Lee, 2008). Attempts to deploy acquirer’s capabilities to distant contexts are unlikely to 
be of value and may even be harmful (Levitt and March, 1988; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 
1999; Kim and Miner, 2007; Kim, Kim and Miner, 2009; Zollo, 2009; Zollo and Reuer, 
2010). We thus expect that acquirers pursuing capability deployment will prefer targets with 
weak capabilities in existing contexts (Bruton, Oviatt and White, 1994; Berchicci et al., 2010). 
Next, consider the acquisition of new capabilities. Clearly, acquirers looking to 
acquire new capabilities from the target will prefer targets with strong capabilities so as to 
maximize value creation (King et al., 2008). And since the purpose here is not to replace the 
weaker firm’s capabilities with those of the stronger firm (as in capability deploying 
acquisitions), but to combine the capabilities of the two firms to create joint value, acquirers 
should be able to capture some part of the joint value created through acquiring and 
recombining target capabilities, so long as they possess strong and distinctive capabilities of 
their own (Capron and Pistre, 2002). This need for distinctive capabilities also means that 
acquirers seeking to acquire new capabilities will prefer targets in new and non-overlapping 
contexts, so as to acquire capabilities that they do not already possess (Karim and Mitchell, 
2000; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Capron and Mitchell, 2009). Targets in highly overlapping 
contexts will have capabilities that are largely redundant for the target, and are therefore less 
likely to be valuable (Kim and Finkelstein, 2009; Makri et al., 2010). Of course, the two 
4 While acquirers could create value by using target’s capabilities to replace their own, they are unlikely to 
capture much of this value since it results from the target’s superior capabilities and is thus likely to be captured 
by the target as a result of competitive bidding in the market (Barney, 1988; Capron and Pistre, 2002). 
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contexts will need to be related in some way (Singh and Montgomery, 1987; Uhlenbruck, 
Hitt and Semadeni, 2006; Kim and Finkelstein, 2009; Makri et al., 2010) to ensure that the 
target’s capabilities are relevant to the acquirer (Kim and Miner, 2007; Lee, 2008). Firms 
seeking to acquire new capabilities will thus prefer targets in new, but related, contexts. 
Differences in level and context also have implications for the costs of acquisition. 
Acquirers face problems of information asymmetry in identifying and evaluating targets 
(Reuer et al., 2004; Capron and Shen, 2007), and these problems are likely to be more severe 
as they pursue targets in new and less familiar contexts (Baum et al., 2000; Villalonga and 
McGahan, 2005; Schildt and Laamanen, 2006; Yang, Lin and Lin, 2010; Chakrabarti and 
Mitchell, 2013). Differences in context will also be associated with ex post integration 
challenges (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991), given differences in 
culture (Ranft and Lord, 2002; Stahl and Voigt, 2008) and greater internal resistance (Larsson 
and Finkelstein, 1999), though these challenges may be offset by a lower need for integration 
(Mitchell and Shaver, 2003; Zaheer et al., 2013). Integration challenges are also likely to be 
higher when acquiring more capable targets given the need to protect and maintain their 
existing capabilities and resources from the disruptive effects of acquisition (Puranam, Singh 
and Zollo, 2006; Paruchuri, Nerkar and Hambrick, 2006; Puranam and Srikanth, 2007), 
though acquirers may also find it difficult to integrate extremely weak targets, which may 
lack the absorptive capacity to benefit from capability deployment.  
Together, these arguments suggest that acquirers will pursue two distinct types of 
targets, each associated with a distinct source of value. On the one hand, they will target 
firms with low levels of capability in existing or close contexts, seeking to realize value by 
deploying their existing capabilities to these targets in order to improve their performance. 
On the other hand, they will target firms with high levels of capability in new (though 
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related) contexts, seeking to benefit from the acquisition of capabilities that they can 
recombine with their own. Of the two, capability deploying acquisitions will face both lower 
ex ante information costs and lower ex post integration costs than capability acquiring 
acquisitions, and thus are more likely to be pursued on average. 
A simple model of capabilities-based target selection 
In order to lay out these arguments more rigorously, we develop a simple formal model of 
capabilities-based target selection. The model is helpful because it allows us to consider the 
combined effect of the various benefits and costs associated with the acquisition in an 
integrated and coherent way, to clarify our conceptual argument in unambiguous terms, and 
to develop several fine-grained and non-intuitive predictions regarding capabilities-based 
target selection.    
Consider two firms, A and B. The stand-alone value of each firm, i.e. the net present 
value of its expected future cash flows5, 𝑉𝑉, is determined by the combination of its focal 
capability 𝜃𝜃, and a vector of other complementary capabilities and resources 𝜂𝜂, so that  𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 = 𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴𝜂𝜂𝐴𝐴  and 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 =  𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵𝜂𝜂𝐵𝐵  where  𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴 > 0, 𝜂𝜂𝐴𝐴 > 0,𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 > 0, 𝜂𝜂𝐵𝐵 > 0. Since we are interested in 
the effect of the focal capability 𝜃𝜃 on target choice, we make the parsimonious assumption 
that 𝜂𝜂𝐴𝐴 =  𝜂𝜂𝐵𝐵 =  𝜂𝜂.  
The two firms operate in distinct but overlapping contexts, with the extent of 
overlap between them captured by parameter  𝑟𝑟 where higher values of  𝑟𝑟 mean greater 
overlap between contexts, and 1 ≥ 𝑟𝑟 ≥ 0. A value of  𝑟𝑟 equal to 1 means the two contexts 
are identical, while a value of 0 means they are entirely unrelated. 
Next, consider, without loss of generality, the case where firm A acquires firm B. As 
5 For simplicity, we assume that each firm is accurately valued by the market, i.e. that the market value of the 
firm reflects the best estimate of future cash flows, and there are thus no opportunities for purely speculative 
gains.  
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discussed above, a capabilities-based perspective suggests two sources of potential value 
from such an acquisition. First, to the extent that the capabilities of the two firms overlap 
(captured by 𝑟𝑟), the stronger firm can deploy its capabilities to the weaker firm, raising the 
weaker firm’s capabilities to its own level, i.e. to max(𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴,𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵) . Thus, the value created 
through capability deployment is equal to 𝜂𝜂𝑟𝑟(2 max(𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴,𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵) − 𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴 − 𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵).  
Second, to the extent that the capabilities are non-overlapping (captured by 1- 𝑟𝑟), 
each firm could benefit from acquiring the non-overlapping portion of the other’s 
capabilities. The extent of this benefit will be limited by the extent to which the two 
capabilities are related, however. We assume that the extent to which each firm benefits 
from the other’s non-overlapping capabilities is proportional to the extent of overlap (𝑟𝑟) 
between them. Thus, firm A will acquire additional capabilities equal to 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑟𝑟)𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 and firm 
B will acquire additional capabilities equal to 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑟𝑟)𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴6.  The benefit from capability 
acquisition is thus strongest when the target and acquirer have moderately overlapping 
capabilities (𝑟𝑟 = 0.5), consistent with prior literature (Kim and Finkelstein, 2009; Makri et 
al., 2010)—firms have little to gain from acquiring capabilities that are either extremely 
similar (and therefore redundant) or completely unrelated (and therefore irrelevant). 
 In addition to these sources of potential value, the acquisition will also be associated 
with several costs. First, the acquiring firm will face an ex ante information cost associated 
with the difficulty of identifying and evaluating a potential target. As prior literature has 
shown, acquirers are liable to overpay for targets, due to factors such as poor due diligence, 
escalation of commitment, and managerial hubris (Haunschild, Davis-Blake, and Fichman, 
1994; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Puranam, Powell, and Singh, 2006). Such overpayment 
6 These additional capabilities may be thought of as either enhancing the firm’s existing capabilities or being 
separately combined with the firm’s complementary resources. The two are equivalent in terms of the model 
since 𝜂𝜂(𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴 + 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑟𝑟)𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵) =  𝜂𝜂𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴 + 𝜂𝜂𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑟𝑟)𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵. 
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represents a cost to the acquirer, and is likely to be higher, the more difficult it is for firms to 
accurately assess the value of potential synergies (Laamanen, 2007). Specifically, we assume 
that this cost will increase with the distance between the contexts of the two firms (Schildt 
and Laamanen, 2006; Chakrabarti and Mitchell, 2013), and reduce with the buyer’s 
acquisition capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Zollo and Singh, 2004), since more 
capable acquirers will be able to better identify and evaluate targets (Laamanen and Keil, 
2008; Kim et al., 2011). We thus model the information cost incurred by the acquirer as 
equal to (1 − 𝑟𝑟) 𝐼𝐼
𝛼𝛼
 where 𝛼𝛼 > 0 is a parameter reflecting firm A’s acquisition capabilities, 
and 𝐼𝐼 ≥ 0 is a parameter reflecting information costs specific to the target. 𝐼𝐼 may depend 
upon a number of factors, such as the nature of the target, the information context (Capron 
and Shen, 2007), and prior ties between acquirer and target (Vanhaverbeke, Duysters and 
Noorderhaven, 2002; Zaheer, Hernandez and Banerjee, 2012).  
Second, the acquiring firm will face an ex post cost resulting from the challenges 
associated with integrating the operations of two distinct firms. We expect these costs to first 
increase and then decrease with the level of target capability, with targets whose capabilities 
are similar in level to the acquirer’s being the easiest to integrate. On the one hand, targets 
with very weak capabilities will lack the absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) 
necessary to benefit from the deployment of acquirer capabilities, and acquirers may thus 
face severe challenges in integrating significantly inferior targets. On the other hand, targets 
with capabilities substantially superior to those of the acquirer will need to be handled 
carefully in order to protect and maintain their capabilities, and thus also pose a significant 
integration challenge for acquirers (Puranam et al., 2006; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam and 
Srikanth, 2007). We therefore expect integration costs to first decrease and then increase 
with target capability, being lowest when target capabilities are at the same level as those of 
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the acquirer. Integration will also become more difficult as the distance between contexts 
increases. Even as distance increases the difficulty of integration, however, it will also reduce 
the need for integration (Mitchell and Shaver, 2003), so that integration costs will be high for 
moderately related targets but low for both closely related targets (that are relatively easy to 
integrate) and unrelated targets (that do not require integration).  
In line with these arguments, we model the integration cost as 𝑟𝑟[(1 − 𝑟𝑟)+ (|𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 −
𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴|)𝛿𝛿𝜂𝜂] 𝐶𝐶𝛼𝛼, where 𝐶𝐶 is a parameter reflecting integration costs (𝐶𝐶 ≥ 0), and 𝛿𝛿 is a parameter 
reflecting the difficulty of integrating a stronger target relative to the difficulty of integrating 
a target in a different context (𝛿𝛿 ≥ 0)7. As with information costs, we expect the cost of 
integration to be driven in part by the buyer’s acquisition capabilities (𝛼𝛼) and in part by other 
contextual variables, such as differences in organizational culture and ownership, or the prior 
relationship between the two firms, reflected here in the parameter 𝐶𝐶.  
Given these assumptions, the value of the merged firm is given by: 
𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 =  𝜂𝜂𝐴𝐴� 𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴,𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵)  + (1 − 𝑟𝑟)(𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴 +  𝑟𝑟𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵)� +  𝜂𝜂𝐵𝐵� 𝑟𝑟 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴,𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵)   +(1 − 𝑟𝑟)(𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 +  𝑟𝑟𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴)� − 1𝛼𝛼 [(1 − 𝑟𝑟)𝐼𝐼 +  𝑟𝑟((1 − 𝑟𝑟)+ (|𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 − 𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴|)𝛿𝛿𝜂𝜂)𝐶𝐶]  
= 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 +  𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 + [𝑟𝑟𝜂𝜂(2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴,𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵) − (𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴 + 𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵))] + [𝜂𝜂𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑟𝑟)(𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 +  𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴)]   
−
1
𝛼𝛼
[(1 − 𝑟𝑟)𝐼𝐼 +  𝑟𝑟((1 − 𝑟𝑟)+ (|𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 − 𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴|)𝛿𝛿𝜂𝜂)𝐶𝐶]     …(1)  
 setting  𝜂𝜂𝐴𝐴 =  𝜂𝜂𝐵𝐵 =  𝜂𝜂 , and rearranging terms. 
 Expression (1) shows that the difference between the stand alone value of A and B 
and their merged value is driven by three factors: the value created through the deployment 
of the superior firm’s capabilities to the inferior firm (the first term in square brackets), the 
7 We include the parameter 𝛿𝛿 to account for the fact that the challenges of integrating two firms across 
contexts may be different from those of integrating two firms with different levels of capability. In the special 
case where 𝛿𝛿 = 0 firms only face integration costs when acquiring outside their existing contexts  
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value created through the combination of the two firms’ (unrelated but relevant) capabilities 
(the second term in square brackets), and the information and integration costs of the 
acquisition (the third term in square brackets).  
Since our focus is on A’s decision to acquire B, however, we need to consider the 
share of this value that will be captured by A. To determine this, we make three 
assumptions. First, we assume that value created from capability deployment will be 
captured by the stronger firm (i.e. by the firm whose capabilities are being deployed to create 
this value)8. Second, we assume that the value created from the combination of non-
overlapping capabilities is split equally between the two firms9. Third, we assume that the 
information and integration costs are borne exclusively by the acquirer. Given these 
assumptions, the price paid by acquirer A for target B (𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵) is: 
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
𝐵𝐵 =  𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 + max�0, 𝑟𝑟𝜂𝜂(𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 −  𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴)� +   𝑚𝑚(1−𝑚𝑚)𝜂𝜂(𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴+𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵)2  + (1 − 𝑟𝑟) 𝐼𝐼𝛼𝛼 …(2) 
That is, the acquirer pays the stand alone value of the target, plus the target’s share of 
potential synergies, plus some excess amount resulting from information challenges10. Note 
that 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 ≤  𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵, so that the target always benefits from the acquisition. Using (1) and (2), we 
can derive the value captured by the acquirer (π𝐴𝐴) as:  
π𝐴𝐴 =  𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 −  𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 −  𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 =  𝑟𝑟𝜂𝜂 �(𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴 − 𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵) + (1−𝑚𝑚)(𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴+𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵)2 � − 1𝛼𝛼 [(1 − 𝑟𝑟)𝐼𝐼 − 𝑟𝑟((1 − 𝑟𝑟)+ (𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴 − 𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵)𝛿𝛿𝜂𝜂)𝐶𝐶] if 𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴 ≥ 𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 ;  
8 Strictly speaking, our predictions require only that the weaker firm capture a substantially smaller share of the 
value from capability deployment than the stronger firm, and that this share not increase with the capabilities of 
the stronger firm. Thus, even if acquirers were to capture some small benefit from buying superior targets and 
using their capabilities to substitute for the acquirer’s own, the predictions from our model will still hold.  
9 We assume an equal split of value for simplicity. The share that each party captures of the value they jointly 
create will be the outcome of a complex bargaining process, modeling which would require making additional 
assumptions about the relative bargaining position of the two parties (their opportunity costs, utility functions, 
risk preferences, etc), and is beyond our current scope.  
10 The premium paid by the acquirer is given by 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 −  𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 , and includes both acquirer overpayment and the 
target’s share of synergies.  
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 𝑚𝑚(1−𝑚𝑚)𝜂𝜂(𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴+𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵)
2
−
1
𝛼𝛼
[(1 − 𝑟𝑟)𝐼𝐼 −  𝑟𝑟((1 − 𝑟𝑟)+ (𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 − 𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴)𝛿𝛿𝜂𝜂)𝐶𝐶]   if 𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴 < 𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 …(3) 
Expression (3) highlights a key asymmetry between acquiring inferior and superior 
targets, with the benefit from acquiring a target with superior capability coming entirely from 
the acquisition of new capabilities, while that from a target with inferior capability comes 
from a combination of capability deployment and capability acquisition. More generally, (3) 
shows that the value captured by the acquirer is impacted by the level and context of target 
capabilities. Increases in target capability cause the benefit from capability deployment to 
decline, and those from capability acquisition to increase, while integration costs first 
decrease and then increase. Increases in the distance between capability contexts cause the 
benefits of capability deployment to decline and the information costs to increase, while 
both capability acquisition benefits and integration costs first increase and then decrease.  
Using (3), we can examine the relationship between target capability and the value 
captured by the acquirer. Taking the partial derivative of (3) with respect to 𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 , we get: 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵
= 𝑟𝑟𝜂𝜂 �𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶
𝛼𝛼
−  (1+𝑚𝑚)
2
�  𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵  ≤  𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴 ;  𝑟𝑟𝜂𝜂 �1−𝑚𝑚2 − 𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝛼𝛼 � 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 >  𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴   …(4) 
 Expression (4) shows that the effect of target capability on acquirer value capture is 
decreasing for inferior targets, so long as (1+𝑚𝑚)
2
> 𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶
𝛼𝛼
 , which is likely to be the case for 
potentially valuable targets11.  Thus, acquirers pursuing inferior targets will always prefer 
targets with low levels of capability, so as to maximize the benefits of capability deployment. 
Moreover, this effect is decreasing with relatedness12, meaning that the firm’s preference for 
inferior targets is stronger in existing or close contexts than in new or distant contexts. For 
11 Note that if 𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶
𝛼𝛼
≥  1
2
, then the acquirer stands to lose half or more of the target’s value as integration costs 
– a case in which the acquirer is unlikely to realize value in any case. We therefore limit our subsequent 
discussion to the case where 𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶
𝛼𝛼
<  1
2
 
12 Formally, 𝜕𝜕
2𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚
= −𝜂𝜂 �1
2
+ 𝑟𝑟 − 𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶
𝛼𝛼
� 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵  ≤  𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴;  𝜂𝜂 �12 − 𝑟𝑟 − 𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝛼𝛼 � 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵 >  𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴   
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superior targets, however, the effect of target capability depends upon the relatedness in 
context. Specifically, we can define 𝑟𝑟∗ = 1 − 2𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶
𝛼𝛼
 such that the acquirer value is increasing in 
target capability level for 𝑟𝑟 <  𝑟𝑟∗, but decreasing for 𝑟𝑟 >  𝑟𝑟∗. For targets with superior 
productivity, our model thus predicts that target value will continue to fall with target 
capability level in existing contexts, but will start to rise with target capability in new 
contexts. Overall, the model predicts that the acquirer will always prefer weak targets in 
existing or close contexts, but that this effect will grow weaker as it starts to consider targets 
in newer, more distant contexts. 
These relationships are shown graphically in Figures 1 to 3. Figure 1 shows a three-
dimensional plot of the value captured by the acquirer (𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴) as a function of target capability 
level (𝜃𝜃𝐵𝐵) and the relatedness of target capability context (𝑟𝑟). It shows that the highest peak 
in acquirer value capture occurs where targets have inferior capability and high relatedness. 
When pursuing targets with similar or superior levels of capability, however, moderate values 
of relatedness are better for the acquirer than high values, with Figure 1 showing a second, 
though lower, peak for targets with superior capability and moderate relatedness. These two 
peaks correspond to the two types of strategic fit in the theory section above—a capability 
deploying peak for targets with low levels of capability in existing contexts, and a capability 
acquiring peak for targets with high levels of capability in new though related contexts. 
Moreover, the relative height of the two peaks confirms our intuition that firms will, on 
average, prefer acquisitions that are primarily capability deploying. Figure 1 also shows that 
acquirers do not capture value from targets in very distant contexts (𝑟𝑟 close to 0) 13, 
suggesting that acquirers are very unlikely to buy extremely distant targets irrespective of the 
13 While 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴could be negative in principle, we assume that the acquirer will never buy a target with negative 
expected value capture, so that the minimum value of 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 plotted is zero.  
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target’s capability level. 
***Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 about here*** 
Figure 2 then shows a simplified two-dimensional version of these relationships, 
plotting the relationship between acquirer value capture and target capability level for 
existing contexts and, separately, for new (moderately related) contexts. It shows that value 
captured by the acquirer declines with target capability for inferior targets, with the decline 
being steeper for targets in existing contexts. For superior targets, the value captured by 
acquirer increases with target capability in new contexts, while continuing to decline with 
target capability in existing contexts, albeit at a slower rate.  Figure 2 thus predicts that 
acquirers will generally prefer targets with weaker capability levels in existing contexts, with 
this preference being stronger for inferior targets; while in new contexts, the effect of target 
capability will be negative for inferior targets and positive for superior targets. It also predicts 
that acquirers will generally prefer targets in existing contexts to those in new contexts. 
Finally, Figure 3 shows how the lines in Figure 2 shift with changes in the buyer’s 
acquisition capability. As expected, the figure shows that firms with strong acquisition 
capabilities capture more value from acquisition than those with weak acquisition 
capabilities, with the advantage being greater in new contexts than in existing contexts. In 
particular, Figure 3 suggests that low acquisition capability firms may find it unprofitable to 
pursue targets in new contexts, on account of the high information and integration costs 
associated with such targets, and may therefore focus their attention on firms with inferior 
capabilities in existing contexts. In contrast, firms with strong acquisition capabilities may 
generally be more willing to pursue superior targets, and especially likely to do so in new 
contexts, on account of their superior ability to keep information and integration costs low.   
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Hypotheses Development 
Having proposed a general theory of capabilities-based target selection, and formalized it in a 
simple model, we now turn to define hypotheses based on the theory, so as to put it to 
empirical test. While we believe that our theory applies across a range of different types of 
capabilities and contexts, our empirical tests in this study focus on a single type of 
capability—manufacturing productivity—and a single definition of context—geographic 
markets. Our purpose, then, is to define testable hypotheses about the selection of targets by 
acquirers based on the level of the target’s manufacturing productivity and its location in 
existing or new geographic markets.  
 Our decision to focus on geographic markets as the salient context builds on prior 
work that has argued that firms face significant challenges when acquiring in new or distant 
geographic markets (Yang et al., 2010), including ex ante information challenges in 
identifying and evaluating targets (Baum et al., 2000; Chakrabarti and Mitchell, 2013), and ex 
post integration challenges resulting from cultural differences across geography (Weber et al., 
1996; Weber and Camerer, 2003; Bjorkman, Stahl and Vaara, 2007) as well as the ongoing 
challenges of managing across geographical distance (Berry, Guillen and Zhou, 2010). 
Consistent with this work, as well as our theoretical argument that acquirers will, on average, 
prefer targets in existing contexts, we propose the baseline hypothesis that: 
H1: The probability of a potential target being acquired will be lower for targets in markets that are 
new to the acquirer than in the acquirer’s existing markets.  
 Next, consider manufacturing productivity as our focal capability. As predicted by 
our model, we expect the effect of target manufacturing productivity to vary based on 
whether the target is in an existing context or a new context. In existing contexts the primary 
source of value for acquirers is capability deployment, the potential for which declines with 
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target productivity. In new contexts acquirers have less to gain from capability deployment 
relative to existing contexts, but have the potential to capture value through capability 
acquisition, the benefit from which increases with target productivity.  Thus, as our model 
predicts and Figure 2 shows, target productivity will have a consistently negative effect on 
acquisition likelihood in existing markets, but in new markets this negative effect will be 
weaker for inferior targets and will become positive for superior targets.  
  In terms of hypotheses, these arguments suggest two things. First, they suggest that, 
on average, the manufacturing productivity of the target will have a negative effect on the 
likelihood of it being acquired. This follows from the fact that acquisition likelihood only 
increases with target productivity for superior targets in new markets, and falls in all other 
cases. Second, they suggest that this general preference for less productive targets will be 
weaker in new markets than in existing markets14. We therefore predict, 
H2: The probability of a potential target being acquired will be greater, the lower the manufacturing 
productivity of the target.  
H3: The negative relation between the productivity of a potential target and its acquisition likelihood 
will be weaker for targets in markets that are new to the acquirer than in the acquirer’s existing 
markets. 
 While the hypotheses above make no distinction between acquirers, our theoretical 
discussion above suggests that acquirers’ target preferences will vary with their acquisition 
capabilities. Specifically, as predicted by our formal model and shown in Figure 3, we expect 
that firms with weak acquisition capabilities will generally limit themselves to pursuing 
weaker targets in existing regions, on account of the high information and integration costs 
14 In principle, our theory suggests that we should test the effect of target productivity separately for targets 
inferior to the acquirer and those superior to the acquirer. While we do so empirically using a two-slope model 
(described in detail below), we do not define separate hypotheses for the two cases for the sake of brevity. 
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of pursuing other types of targets. In contrast, firms with strong acquisition capabilities will 
be better able to overcome these information and integration costs, and are therefore likely 
to both undertake more acquisitions, and pursue a wider set of targets (Mitchell and Shaver, 
2003; Zollo and Singh, 2004; Laamanen and Keil, 2008). Specifically, we expect such firms to 
be more willing to pursue superior targets and those in new regions. We therefore 
hypothesize: 
 H4a: The negative relation between the productivity of a potential target and its acquisition 
likelihood will be weaker, the stronger the buyer’s acquisition capabilities. 
H4b: The positive moderating effect of new regions on the relation between target productivity and 
acquisition likelihood will be stronger, the stronger the buyer’s acquisition capabilities. 
   
DATA AND METHODS 
Chinese Brewing Industry 
We test these predictions by examining acquisitions in the Chinese brewing industry from 
1998 to 2007. The years between 1998 and 2007 marked a period of substantial growth and 
consolidation for China’s brewing industry. During this period, industry output increased 
from 38.7 billion RMB to 83.1 billion RMB (all numbers are in 1998 RMB), making China 
the largest beer market in the world. This rapid growth was accompanied by increasing 
consolidation achieved through aggressive acquisition activity, with the eight-firm 
concentration ratio increasing from 28.7 percent to 67.5 percent during the same time 
period, turning a fragmented industry with over 400 small, local brewers into a consolidated 
industry with large national players – a consolidation not dissimilar to the one that occurred 
in the US brewing industry in the 1950s (McGahan, 1991).   
Underlying this rapid growth and consolidation was a cross-industry change in 
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Chinese government policy. Prior to the mid-1990s, Chinese industry had been largely 
regional, with high trade barriers between administrative regions within the country. There 
are 31 such administrative regions in mainland China, each with different subcultures, 
dialects, income levels, and levels of market development and competition (Chang and Wu, 
2014). Prior to deregulation, each region operated as a self-contained market with the 
objective of each regional administration being to maximize local economic growth.  
With the progress of economic reform and liberalization, there was a growing 
impetus away from self-contained regional markets towards greater exploitation of scale and 
scope economies on a national scale (Gilley, 2001), enabled by the lowering of inter-regional 
barriers by the government. The Chinese brewing industry was no exception to this policy 
change, with the government lowering or removing restrictions on the sale of beer across 
regions, and explicitly favoring the growth of large national brewers.   
These policy changes provide a unique opportunity to study target selection because 
they represent an arguably exogenous change that makes salient a large number of acquirer-
target combinations that were previously untenable. A key challenge with studying acquirer 
target selection empirically is the difficulty of accounting for the endogeneity of the acquirer 
and target’s pre-acquisition positions. In the case of the Chinese brewing industry, however, 
there is a strong policy rationale for why acquirers did not consider either acquiring in other 
regions or consolidating within their existing region prior to our study period. As a result we 
have the unique opportunity to observe firms choosing between a set of potential targets 
that they may not have considered before for reasons exogenous to the acquirers themselves. 
There are several other factors that make the Chinese brewing industry a good 
setting to empirically test our theory. First, the high levels of acquisition activity in a short 
period of time mean that we have sufficient variance to test our predictions in a single 
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industry in a single country. Second, the regional and fragmented nature of the industry 
before 1998, as well as the size and geographic diversity of China, enables us to treat the 
different regions of the country as distinct markets. Third, the study context provides access 
to detailed, comprehensive and statutory data on the entire population of firms in the 
industry, allowing us to consider the complete pool of potential targets.  
Data 
This study uses the Annual Industrial Survey Database (1998-2007) from the Chinese 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)15. The NBS collects financial information on all 
industrial establishments whose sales are more than 5M RMB (roughly US$ 685,000 using 
the 2007 exchange rate) with each plant being treated as a separate establishment, as it is a 
tax paying legal entity16. By law, all qualified plants in China are required to cooperate with 
the survey and submit the requested financial information. From this full NBS database, we 
extract data for the brewing industry based on the Chinese 4-digit standard industry 
classification code (1513 prior to 2003 and 1522 thereafter). Based on this plant-level dataset, 
we manually identify parent firms for each plant for each year. To do so, we first search each 
firm’s annual reports (if they are publicly listed) and website. We then search newspaper and 
magazine articles and analyst reports, both in Chinese and in English, through the China 
National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI), Baidu.com, Google.com, Business Monitor 
Online, IBISWorld, ABI/Inform Global, and Business Source Complete, and use these 
other sources to verify and cross-check our matching. We consider an acquisition to have 
occurred when a change in parent firm occurs. Using this method, we identify 184 total 
15 We end our study in 2007 because it is the last year for which data from the NBS is available to us. 
16 Because plants are independent legal entities in the Chinese context, they are called ‘firms’ in the dataset. For 
the sake of consistent presentation, however, we call the reporting entity a plant, and the ultimate owner a firm 
throughout the paper.  
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acquisitions during our study time period (1998-2007)17 . Finally, we construct firm-level 
variables by aggregating plant-level measures where necessary.  
Measures 
Dependent variable  
Since we wish to understand the decision of an acquiring firm to acquire a potential target 
plant, we create all possible combinations of acquirer-target-year, which is our unit of 
analysis. The dependent variable Acquisition is a binary variable, taking the value of one if a 
given firm acquires a given target plant in a given year and taking the value of zero if not. All 
plants existing at time t are considered potential acquisition targets by a given acquiring firm. 
An acquiring firm or a target plant is dropped from the sample if it dissolves. Note that this 
approach allows us to account for the complete population of potential targets, and 
eliminates any concern of sample selection bias (Berchicci et al., 2012). Overall, there are 
1,229,057 acquirer-target-year combinations, including the 184 actual acquisitions. 
Main predictors 
We measure a firm’s manufacturing productivity using the productivity index developed by 
Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) and later modified by Aw, Chung, and Roberts 
(2003)18. This productivity index has several advantages over conventional parametric 
17Non-beer industry firms acquired breweries in 34 cases. Because these non-beer industry parents became 
valid participants in the brewing industry only after these acquisitions, we exclude these 34 cases. These 
corporate parents do however enter our analysis as potential acquirers and targets after these events.  
18 The productivity index is defined as follows: 
 
Productivityit=(lnYit - 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡) +  ∑ (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜏𝜏  𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏=2 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜏𝜏−1 ) − [∑ 12𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 �𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡��𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡� +  ∑ ∑ 12𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏=2  �𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏 + 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏−1 ��𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏 −
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏−1  �]                                                                 
 
where i denotes firm, t year, and j type of input (j=1,…,m). Yit denotes output, and Xijt denotes inputs including 
labor input, material input, and capital stock. Sijt denotes input shares, defined as the ratio of labor costs to 
output for labor input, the ratio of material costs to output for material input, and one minus labor share and 
material share for capital input. The first term in this equation captures the deviation of a firm’s output in year t 
from the industry average output in that year. The second term reflects the change in industry average output 
across all years. The third and fourth terms repeat the same for each input j, which are summed using input 
share for each firm (Sijt) and the average input share for each 3-digit industry (𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 in the third term and 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏−1  in 
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measures, such as the residuals from the Cobb-Douglas production function and its variants 
(Van Biesebrock, 2007). The index is straightforward in computation, flexible in allowing 
heterogeneous production technology, and allows for consistent comparison of plant level 
productivity across years. Our main independent variable Target Productivity is the value of this 
productivity index for the potential target plant in the previous year. Note that we include a 
control for Acquirer Productivity (measured in the same way) in all our models, so that the 
coefficient of Target Productivity captures the effect of target capability controlling for that of 
the acquiring firm19. In order to calculate Acquirer Productivity for acquirers with more than 
one plant, we aggregate their productivity to its weighted average, using plant sales as 
weights.  
We operationalize markets as geographic regions, with each geographic region being 
treated as a distinct market. Our main predictor is then a binary variable New Region which 
takes the value one if the target operates in a region where the acquirer has no existing 
presence, and zero otherwise.  
We consider two alternate measures of acquisition capability. First, we consider the 
extent of a firm’s geographic diversification, on the basis that geographically diversified firms 
are likely to have both greater experience coordinating and organizing across multiple 
markets, and more generalized capabilities (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988; Goerzen and 
Beamish, 2003; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005; Levinthal and Wu, 2010), and that this will 
enable them to better evaluate and integrate new targets (Barkema and Vermuelen, 1998; 
Zollo and Winter, 2002; Chakrabarti and Mitchell, 2013). Acquirer Geographic Diversification is 
calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index of its sales distribution across regions. 
the fourth term) in each year as weights. The productivity index measures the proportional difference between 
the productivity of firm i in year t relative to the hypothetical firm in the base year. 
19 In robustness tests (available upon request), we replace our Target Productivity variable with a measure of the 
target’s productivity relative to the acquirer. Our results continue to hold with this alternate measure. 
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Second, we consider the firm’s prior Acquisition Experience (measured as the count of 
acquisitions the firm has undertaken in the past) as a measure of acquisition capability, 
consistent with prior work (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005; 
Puranam and Srikanth, 2007; Kim et al, 2011). While the two measures represent distinct 
theoretical constructs, they are highly related in our empirical context, since most expansion 
into new areas is undertaken through acquisition. We therefore use both geographic 
diversification and acquisition experience as measures of general acquisition capabilities.   
Control variables 
In addition to these main independent variables, we include a number of controls. First, to 
account for the role of market power and economies of scale in driving acquisitions 
(Chandler, 1990), we include controls for (logged) values of both Acquirer Sales and Target 
Sales20. Second, we control for the acquirer’s financial constraint by including a measure of 
Acquirer Debt Level calculated as the ratio of the acquiring firm’s total debt to its total equity. 
Third, we control for the nature of acquirer ownership by including dummy variables for 
whether the acquirer is Majority State Owned or Majority Foreign Owned. We also include a 
control for Ownership Difference which takes the value one if the majority owner of the 
acquirer is of a different type (using a five part classification of ownership types as state, 
foreign, private, collective, or incorporated) from the majority owner of the target. Fourth, 
we control for Business Group Affiliation, an institutional factor in emerging markets that can 
influence a firm’s acquisition propensity by affecting access to internal capital market, agency 
behavior, and risk sharing (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Chang, 2003; Ma, 
Yao, and Xi, 2006). Fifth, to account for differences in the richness of the information 
20 To account for the possibility that firms are buying inferior plants with the intent of closing them to 
eliminate competition, we also look at whether targets were closed shortly after acquisition. We find no plants 
that were closed within four years of being acquired, and only four acquired plants that were ever closed, 
suggesting that this was not a major driver of acquisitions in our context, perhaps due to rapid industry growth.   
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context (Capron and Shen, 2007), we include a Region Information Index, which measures the 
availability of information intermediaries (specifically lawyers and accountants) in the target’s 
region, and is a sub-index of a marketization index of Chinese provinces created by the 
National Economic Research Institute (Chang and Wu, 2014). Finally, to control for the 
extent of rivalry in the target market we include a measure of Region Concentration, measured 
as the Herfindahl index of industry sales in the target region. 
Summary statistics and correlations of these variables are provided in Table 1. 
*** Insert Table 1 about here *** 
Model 
The dependent variable for our study is a dichotomous variable that captures the acquisition 
decision for all possible combinations of acquirers and targets; we use a logit regression to 
estimate the model. A conventional logit model estimates the acquisition probability with the 
following functional form: 
ijtijtjtit
ijt
ijt regionyearZYX
P
P
εββββ ++++++=
− 3210)1(
ln  
where Pi is the probability that the acquisition event occurs, i.e. that the ith acquirer will 
acquire the jth target plant in year t. The log odds of the probability are estimated to be 
linearly affected21 by a vector of the acquiring firm’s characteristics (Xit), target plant 
characteristics (Yit) including Target Productivity, and the New Region measure (Zijt). We lag all 
the independent variables by one year. All models contain year and region dummies. Since a 
given acquirer could potentially acquire multiple target plants over multiple years, robust 
standard errors are used to account for intra-firm non-independence of observations 
21 In supplementary analysis (available upon request) we also include the square of Target Productivity in both 
our one-slope and two-slope models in order to test for curvilinear effects. We find no evidence for a 
significant effect of these square terms.  
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(Rogers, 1993; White, 1980). 
Since our analytical model predicts that the effect of target productivity will vary 
depending upon whether the target’s productivity is superior or inferior to that of the 
acquirer, we also use a two-slope model (Greene, 1993; Baum et al., 2005), splitting our main 
Target Productivity measure into a measure of Superior Productivity = Target Productivity if Target 
Productivity > Acquirer Productivity and zero otherwise, and a measure of Inferior Productivity = 
Target Productivity if Target Productivity ≤ Acquirer Productivity and zero otherwise, and including 
these two new measures and their interaction with our New Region dummy in our regression. 
For completeness, we also include a dummy variable for Superior Target, which equals 1 if 
Target Productivity > Acquirer Productivity and zero otherwise22.  
One concern with our analysis is that our sample is overwhelmingly dominated by 
non-events (we have 184 events out of a total of 1,229,057 observations), so that a 
traditional logit model may underestimate the probability of rare events, in turn biasing its 
estimation of coefficients (King and Zeng, 2001). To address this issue, we used the rare 
event logit model developed by King and Zeng (2001) and used by other researchers (Henisz 
and Delios, 2001; Jensen, 2003; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Zhou, 2011).  
 
RESULTS 
The results of our analysis are shown in Table 2. Model I is the baseline model with all 
controls. Model II then includes our main predictors. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, New 
Region enters the regression with a negative and significant sign, implying that firms are less 
likely to pursue targets in new markets. Model II also shows support for Hypothesis 2, with 
the coefficient of Target Productivity being negative and significant, implying that firms are less 
22 52.4 percent of potential targets in our final sample have productivity greater than the acquirer, though only 
30.4 percent of targets that are acquired have superior productivity.  
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likely to buy a potential target, the greater its productivity. Finally, the interaction between 
New Region and Target Productivity enters the regression with a positive and significant 
coefficient. This implies that acquirers’ preference for less productive targets is significantly 
weaker in new markets than in existing markets, supporting Hypothesis 3.   
Model III is a two-slope model, testing our theoretical prediction that the effect of 
target productivity on acquisition likelihood varies with whether the target is superior or 
inferior to the acquirer. For Inferior Productivity, our model predicts a negative effect for both 
existing and new regions, with this effect being weaker in new regions. Model III shows that 
Inferior Productivity does in fact have a significant negative effect on acquisition likelihood, 
consistent with our prediction and further confirming Hypothesis 2, but the interaction 
between Inferior Productivity and New Region, while positive (as predicted), is not significant. 
Turning to Superior Productivity, our analytical model predicts that its effect will be negative for 
existing regions, but positive for new regions. Model III shows support for this prediction, 
with the main effect of Superior Productivity being significant and negative, while its interaction 
with New Region is significant and positive. We thus see a reversal of slope in the effect of 
Superior Productivity between existing and new regions, with a significant difference between 
them, which is consistent with our analytical model and provides strong support for 
Hypothesis 3.  
***Insert Table 2 and Figures 4a and 4b about here*** 
Given the non-linear nature of our model, we cannot directly interpret the 
interaction effects in Table 2 (Hoetker, 2007). To understand these interactions better, we 
graph them out using the simulation-based approach suggested by Zelner (2009). Figure 4a 
shows the predicted likelihood of acquisition as a function of target productivity for targets 
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in new and existing regions separately (based on Model III) 23. All other independent 
variables are set to either their sample mean (for non-binary variables) or their sample mode 
(for binary variables) (Zelner, 2009).  Figure 4b then plots the difference between the new 
and existing region lines shown in Figure 4a, along with a 95 percent confidence interval 
around the predicted difference. These plots show that acquisition likelihood declines with 
target productivity for inferior targets in both new and existing regions, though the 
likelihood of acquisition is significantly higher for targets in existing regions than in new 
regions. For superior targets, acquisition likelihood continues to decline with target 
productivity for targets in existing regions, but starts to rise for targets in new regions, with 
the difference in the two slopes being significant. As the figure shows, acquisition likelihood 
is significantly lower in new regions than in existing regions for targets with productivity 
similar to the acquirer, but becomes higher in new regions than in existing regions (though 
not significantly so) for targets with substantially higher productivity than the acquirer, 
consistent with Hypothesis 3. In general, Figure 4a is strongly consistent with Figure 2, 
providing support for our theory. 
These results are economically significant. Holding all other variables at their average 
level, a target in an existing region with manufacturing productivity one standard deviation 
below that of the acquirer is 51 percent more likely to be acquired than a target with 
productivity equal to the acquirer, while a target with productivity one standard deviation 
above the acquirer is 42 percent less likely to be acquired. For targets in new regions, a target 
with productivity one standard deviation below the acquirer is 29 percent more likely to be 
acquired, and a target with productivity one standard deviation above the acquirer is 61 
23 Because we consider the entire population of potential targets, the baseline probability of acquisition is very 
low (184 events out of 1,229,057 observations), reflecting the fact that the chance of one firm in the industry 
acquiring another in a given year is generally negligible.  
27 
 
                                                 
 A capabilities-based perspective on target selection 
percent more likely to be acquired, compared to a target with productivity equal to the 
acquirer.  
To test hypotheses 4a and 4b we turn to a split sample analysis which is shown in 
Models IV to VII. Models IV and V show the results of our two-slope regression in the 
subsamples of geographically diversified and focused (i.e. single region) firms respectively, 
while Models VI and VII show them for subsamples of firms with and without prior 
acquisition experience. Both sets of results show a similar pattern: first, consistent with H4a, 
the coefficient of Inferior Productivity is more negative for firms with weak acquisition 
capabilities than for those with strong acquisition capabilities, with the difference in 
coefficients being significant for focused vs. diversified acquirers (z=3.80***), though not 
for experienced vs. inexperienced acquirers (z=1.33). Hypothesis 4a is thus partially 
supported. Second, consistent with Hypothesis 4b, we see a positive and significant 
interaction between Inferior Productivity and New Region in less capable acquirers, but an 
insignificant (and negative) coefficient for high capability acquirers, with the difference 
between them being significant (z=3.10*** for the difference between diversified and 
focused acquirers, and z=2.33** for the difference between experienced and inexperienced 
acquirers). Hypothesis 4b is thus supported. Third, we also see that the effects of Superior 
Productivity are only significant in the case of strong acquisition capability firms, i.e., those 
that are geographically diversified or have prior acquisition experience. In particular, the 
coefficient of the interaction between Superior Productivity and New Region is positive and 
highly significant for strong acquisition capability firms, but insignificantly different from 
zero for weak acquisition capability firms. Though the difference in these coefficients 
between the two types of acquirers is not statistically significant in either case (largely due to 
the high standard error of the coefficients in the weak acquisition capability case), these 
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results are directionally consistent with our predictions in Hypotheses 4a and 4b. 
To interpret these results more clearly, we graph the results for Models IV and V in 
Figure 5a and 5b respectively using the same approach as that used in Figure 4a24 (graphs for 
Models VI and VII, not shown, are similar). Consistent with our theoretical predictions, 
these graphs show that firms with weak acquisition capabilities generally restrict themselves 
to acquiring inferior targets in existing regions. They almost never acquire targets in new 
regions, and are also very unlikely to buy superior targets. In contrast, firms with strong 
acquisition capabilities are not only more likely to undertake acquisitions in general, but they 
are open to a broader range of targets, including targets with superior productivity, and those 
in new regions. Interestingly, these figures show that geographically diversified acquirers 
have a higher propensity to acquire targets with similar capability levels in existing areas, than 
predicted by our model. It may be that firms with strong acquisition capabilities are able to 
capture some value from ‘cream-skimming’ acquisitions, or to realize complementarities 
between different types of functional capabilities. That one difference aside, the consistency 
between our theoretical predictions in Figure 3 and the observed empirical relationships in 
Figures 5a and 5b strongly confirm our theoretical arguments. 
***Insert Figures 5a and 5b about here*** 
 
CONCLUSION 
These empirical findings provide strong support for our theory. As predicted by our 
analytical model, we find that acquirers pursue weak targets in existing markets, consistent 
with capability deployment, but are relatively more willing to acquire superior targets when 
entering new markets, consistent with capability acquisition. These preferences are 
24 All other variables are set to the subsample mean or mode when drawing these figures. Note that the figures 
use different scales, reflecting the greater baseline probability of acquisition by diversified firms.  
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moderated by the buyer’s acquisition capabilities, with firms that have weak acquisition 
capabilities generally limiting themselves to buying inferior targets in existing markets, while 
those with strong acquisition capabilities pursue a broader range of targets and are relatively 
more willing to enter new markets and acquire superior targets.  
By predicting and successfully testing these results, our study contributes to the 
M&A literature in a number of ways. To begin with, it complements and extends recent 
work that offers a capabilities-based perspective on acquisitions (Karim and Mitchell, 2000; 
Capron and Mitchell, 2009), applying this perspective to the question of acquirer target 
selection. We highlight two sources of value from acquisition (Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, 
2008)—the value from deploying the acquirer’s existing capabilities to improve target 
performance (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002; Berchicci et al., 2012) and the value of 
acquiring new capabilities from the target to combine with those of acquirer (Karim and 
Mitchell, 2000; Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Capron and Mitchell, 2009)—
and map these two distinct sources of value to two distinct types of targets, thus expanding 
our conception of strategic fit (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Kim and Finkelstein, 2009). In 
doing so, we shed new light on the long-standing debate between the need for similarity or 
difference in acquisitions (Harrison et al., 1991; Kim and Finkelstein, 2009), emphasizing the 
need to adopt a multi-dimensional perspective when comparing capabilities (Tanriverdi and 
Venkatraman, 2005; Zaheer et al., 2013).  
Our study also advances our understanding of the relatively underexplored question 
of the antecedents of acquirer target selection. While prior work on target selection has 
mainly focused on the information challenges associated with identifying and valuing targets 
(Baum et al., 2000; Schildt and Laamanen, 2006; Chakrabarti and Mitchell, 2013), we bring a 
capabilities-based perspective to bear on the antecedents of target choice, highlighting the 
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different benefits from an acquisition, and their implications for target selection. We do so, 
moreover, by developing a rigorous formal model, one that allows us to consider the 
multiple benefits and costs associated with acquisition in an integrated and coherent way. We 
are then able to validate the predictions of this model in a longitudinal empirical setting 
while accounting for the complete set of potential targets.  
Finally, our study also contributes to the literature on dynamic capabilities (Teece, 
Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007), especially work 
on acquisition capabilities (Zollo and Singh, 2004; Laamanen and Keil, 2008). We show that 
such acquisition capabilities have a significant effect on acquirer target selection, enabling 
more capable acquirers to pursue sources of acquisition value that may be unavailable to 
other firms (Mitchell and Shaver, 2003).  
As with any study, our work has limitations, which provide the opportunity for 
future research and improvement. First, while our theory and results are consistent with 
firms pursuing targets that are likely to maximize acquisition value, we do not directly test 
the performance of the acquisitions we study. We therefore cannot be sure that these 
acquisitions are, in fact, resulting in benefit to the acquirers, nor can we empirically confirm 
that these benefits are the result of capability deployment or acquisition, since we do not 
observe the deployment or recombination of capabilities post-acquisition. Second, while we 
believe that our theory applies broadly to many different types of capabilities across many 
different contexts, we are only able to test our predictions for one type of capability 
(manufacturing productivity) across one type of context (geographic markets). Future work 
could build on our study by extending it to other empirical contexts, using our theory and 
formal model to develop specific predictions for these contexts. Future work could also use 
our model to develop additional predictions, such as predictions about other factors that 
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impact information or integration costs, or predictions about differences in the level of 
complementary resources. Finally, our empirical analysis is limited to a single industry 
(brewing) in a single country (China), one that is experiencing a period of rapid growth. 
Future work could test the generalizability of our findings across other industries and 
countries.  
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Table 1 Summary statistics and correlations 
 
No
. 
Measure Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
1 Acquisition 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 1.00 
            
 
2 Acquirer Sales 10.41 1.75 0.69 16.33 0.03 1.00 
           
 
3 Acquirer Geo. 
Diversification 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.87 0.04 0.45 1.00 
          
 
4 Target Sales 10.52 1.51 1.79 15.33 0.00 0.01 0.01 1.00 
         
 
5 Acquirer 
Experience 0.26 2.02 0.00 33.00 0.05 0.33 0.60 0.01 1.00 
        
 
6 Acquirer Debt 
Level 7.89 10.05 0.00 38.17 -0.01 -0.18 -0.14 -0.01 -0.08 1.00 
       
 
7 Acquirer 
Productivity 0.17 1.01 -2.82 2.77 0.01 0.54 0.17 0.04 0.11 -0.14 1.00 
      
 
8 Majority State 
Owned 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.11 -0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.22 1.00 
     
 
9 Majority Foreign 
Owned 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.37 0.38 0.00 0.12 -0.23 0.11 -0.23 1.00 
    
 
10 Ownership 
Difference 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.17 0.05 1.00 
   
 
11 Business Group 
Affiliation 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.38 0.29 0.00 0.35 -0.11 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.00 1.00 
  
 
12 Region Infor-
mation Index 2.23 2.01 -0.14 11.28 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.21 0.07 -0.05 0.16 -0.22 -0.01 0.02 0.00 1.00   
13 Region 
Concentration 0.26 0.17 0.07 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.09 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.20 1.00  
14 Target 
Productivity 0.24 1.01 -2.82 2.77 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.61 0.03 -0.02 0.06 -0.09 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.24 0.01 1.00 
15 New Region 0.94 0.24 0.00 1.00 -0.02 -0.08 -0.14 0.00 -0.17 0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 
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Table 2 Main results 
 All Acquirers 
Diversified 
Acquirers 
Focused 
Acquirers 
Experienced 
Acquirers 
Inexperienc
ed Acquirers 
 
I II III IV V VI VII 
Acquirer Sales 1.060*** 1.018*** 1.031*** 0.807** 1.240*** 0.245 1.328*** 
 (0.214) (0.210) (0.210) (0.390) (0.298) (0.234) (0.269) 
Acquirer Geog. 0.461 0.030 0.007   0.377 -2.017* 
Diversification (0.925) (0.919) (0.922)   (0.984) (1.108) 
Target Sales 0.167*** 0.269*** 0.274*** 0.250*** 0.294*** 0.276*** 0.260** 
 (0.061) (0.066) (0.064) (0.076) (0.097) (0.064) (0.124) 
Acquirer  -0.021 -0.046 -0.047 -0.028 0.280   
Experience (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.984)   
Acquirer Debt Level -0.024 -0.030 -0.031 -0.176 -0.000 0.064 0.001 
 (0.084) (0.091) (0.092) (0.181) (0.066) (0.110) (0.062) 
Acquirer  -0.230 -0.241 -0.119 -0.147 -0.240 0.055 -0.389 
Productivity (0.321) (0.328) (0.334) (0.539) (0.338) (0.866) (0.313) 
Majority State   0.601 0.549 0.533 1.336** -0.588 1.633*** -0.925* 
Owned (0.548) (0.576) (0.574) (0.603) (0.606) (0.506) (0.552) 
Majority Foreign 1.153*** 1.181*** 1.164*** 1.334*** 1.052* 1.479*** 0.667 
Owned (0.353) (0.382) (0.385) (0.399) (0.600) (0.422) (0.456) 
Ownership  -0.834*** -0.847*** -0.838*** -0.664*** -1.177*** -0.623*** -1.312*** 
Difference (0.160) (0.164) (0.165) (0.109) (0.356) (0.145) (0.380) 
Business Group 1.155*** 1.194*** 1.178*** 1.798*** 0.641** 1.765** -0.078 
Affiliation (0.373) (0.382) (0.381) (0.531) (0.323) (0.692) (0.597) 
Region Information -0.025 -0.105 -0.100 -0.239 0.202 -0.171 -0.260 
Index (0.150) (0.174) (0.173) (0.265) (0.152) (0.287) (0.190) 
Region 1.459 1.390 1.287 1.489 0.817 1.945 1.253 
Concentration (1.403) (1.413) (1.443) (1.252) (1.013) (1.243) (1.912) 
New Region  -2.009*** -2.153*** -2.214*** -2.128*** -1.932*** -3.050*** 
  (0.438) (0.465) (0.538) (0.644) (0.506) (0.511) 
Target Productivity  -0.426***      
  (0.100)      
Target Productivity   0.482***      
*New Region  (0.187)      
Inferior Productivity   -0.384*** -0.178** -1.271*** -0.265*** -0.662** 
   (0.110) (0.076) (0.275) (0.100) (0.282) 
Superior    -0.701* -0.750* -0.146 -1.078** -0.125 
Productivity   (0.413) (0.408) (0.691) (0.440) (0.790) 
Inferior Productivity   0.166 -0.179 1.342*** -0.170 0.880** 
* New Region   (0.243) (0.227) (0.435) (0.260) (0.369) 
Superior    0.839*** 0.888*** 0.190 0.953*** 0.308 
Productivity* New 
Region 
  (0.283) (0.313) (0.695) (0.324) (0.591) 
Superior Target   0.270 0.357 0.364 0.820** -0.457 
   (0.430) (0.421) (0.575) (0.381) (0.880) 
Constant -25.104*** -23.577*** -23.801*** -21.228*** -27.168*** -15.406*** -26.325*** 
 (2.904) (3.027) (3.028) (5.426) (4.284) (3.877) (3.948) 
N 1229057 1229057 1229057 95211 1133846 65822 1163235 
 
Rare-event logit models. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. All models include region and year 
fixed effects. Significance * <0.1, **<.05, *** <.01 
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
 
Figure 3 
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Figure 4a 
 
Figure 4b 
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Figure 5a: Diversified Acquirers 
 
 
Figure 5b: Focused Acquirers 
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